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Non-proliferation

Overview

During the period under review, the Security Council held eleven meetings, including one closed meeting, in which it adopted two resolutions under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter, and received eight briefings by the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to [resolution 1737 \(2006\)](#). The Council imposed new sanctions measures against the Islamic Republic of Iran, established the Panel of Experts pursuant to [resolution 1929 \(2010\)](#)¹ and extended the Panel of Experts' mandate for one year.²

A table lists the meetings held in consideration of this item, as well as related information, including invitees, speakers and decisions adopted.

9 June 2010: imposition of new sanctions measures against the Islamic Republic of Iran

On 9 June 2010, the Security Council met to consider the adoption of a draft resolution that would strengthen sanctions measures against the Islamic Republic of Iran.³ Prior to the adoption of the resolution, the representative of Brazil emphasized that

¹ For more information on the sanctions measures, see part VII, sect. III. A. with regard to decisions adopted in accordance with Article 41 of the Charter. For information on the respective mandates of the Committee established pursuant to [resolution 1540 \(2004\)](#) and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I. B.2, with regard to the Security Council committees established under Chapter VII of the Charter.

² [Resolution 1984 \(2011\)](#).

³ [S/2010/283](#).

her delegation would vote against the draft resolution in order to honor the Tehran Declaration, which she argued provided a unique opportunity to solve the problem through dialogue rather than sanctions. She stated that sanctions would lead to the suffering of the people and play into the hands of those on all sides who did not want a peaceful resolution of the issue. The representative further expressed regret that the Tehran Declaration neither had received the recognition it deserved, nor had been given time to bear fruit.⁴ Similarly speaking, the representative of Turkey argued that the adoption of sanctions would negatively affect the momentum created by the Tehran Declaration and the overall diplomatic process. He further emphasized that adoption of the draft resolution should not be seen as an end to diplomacy, and urged the Islamic Republic of Iran to work towards the implementation of the Tehran Declaration, as well as to resume talks with the “P5+1” (five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany) to discuss its nuclear programme, including the suspension of enrichment.⁵

By [resolution 1929 \(2010\)](#), acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter, while expressing its concern over the proliferation risk presented by the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Council, inter alia, decided that all States should prevent the sale of heavy weapons to the Islamic Republic of Iran; called upon all States to inspect all cargo to and from the Islamic Republic of Iran if they suspected banned cargo was on board; authorized all States to seize and dispose of those prohibited items; called upon all States to prevent the provision of financial services, including insurance and re-insurance, if they suspected such services could contribute to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s banned activities; and requested that the Secretary-General create a panel of up to eight experts for an initial period of one year.

Following the adoption of the resolution, several speakers highlighted the importance of continuing dialogue to achieve diplomatic solutions, and emphasized that imposing sanctions on specific individuals and entities did not seek to harm the general

⁴ [S/PV.6335](#), pp. 2-3.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

population.⁶ Furthermore, the representatives of Austria, Japan, and Nigeria expressed their support for the dual-track process.⁷ Meanwhile, the representative of China emphasized that this new resolution was aimed at bringing the Islamic Republic of Iran back to the negotiating table and activating a new round of diplomatic efforts.⁸

The representative of the United Kingdom acknowledged the good-faith efforts of Turkey and Brazil to persuade the Islamic Republic of Iran to engage with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the Tehran Research Reactor, but argued that his Government could not accept the Islamic Republic of Iran's attempts to use these efforts to justify its continued defiance of successive Security Council resolutions that mandated a suspension of the Islamic Republic of Iran's enrichment operations.⁹

The representative of the United States emphasized that the Islamic Republic of Iran had chosen to clearly and wilfully violate its commitments to the IAEA and the resolutions of the Council. She underlined that this resolution was aimed at reinforcing the need for the Islamic Republic of Iran to comply with its international obligations, and argued that the Tehran Research Reactor proposal did not respond to the fundamental concerns about the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear programme. Furthermore, she emphasized that respect for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should remain at the centre of efforts to stop nuclear proliferation.¹⁰

The representative of Lebanon, while abstaining from the vote and stating that his Government had not reached a final position on the matter, expressed that his Government believed that the understanding reflected in the Tehran Declaration on enriched uranium was a significant step towards a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, and that it did not have the necessary support, nor was it given the necessary time to yield the expected results. Finally, he noted that the new sanctions were a sad setback for diplomatic efforts.¹¹

⁶ Ibid., pp. 4-5 (United States); pp. 7-8 (France); pp. 8-9 (Russian Federation); and pp. 10-11 (China).

⁷ Ibid., p. 10 (Austria); p. 10 (Japan); and p. 12 (Nigeria).

⁸ [S/PV.6335](#), p. 11.

⁹ Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 4-5.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 12.

The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that his Government opposed the development and use of weapons of mass destruction on religious, as well as security grounds, and that his Government was determined to exercise its inalienable right to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and to build on its own scientific advances in developing various peaceful aspects of this technology. He further claimed that his Government had maintained a close collaboration with the IAEA that was robust, proactive, and unprecedented, and also stressed that no amount of pressure or mischief would be able to break his Government's determination to pursue and defend its legal and inalienable rights.¹² In rebuttal, the representative of the United Kingdom argued that the statements made by the Islamic Republic of Iran seemed designed as an excuse to not respond to international concerns about its nuclear programme.¹³

9 June 2011: extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts

On 9 June 2011, by [resolution 1984 \(2011\)](#), the Council, acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter, decided to extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 9 June 2012.

Following the adoption of the resolution, many speakers stressed that the Panel of Experts played a crucial role in ensuring the full implementation of the Council's sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran. They also drew attention to the fact that it was important for the Panel to continue to act impartially and independently.¹⁴ The representatives of the Russian Federation and China both stressed that the Panel should act strictly in accordance with its mandate as established by [resolution 1929 \(2010\)](#).¹⁵ Furthermore, the representative of Lebanon stated that the resolution was purely technical in nature, and because his Government abstained from voting on [resolution 1929 \(2010\)](#), in line with its consistent position, his Government again abstained from the vote on [resolution 1984 \(2011\)](#).¹⁶

¹² [S/PV.6335](#), pp. 15-17.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

¹⁴ [S/PV.6552](#), p. 3 (China); p. 3 (United States); pp. 3-4 (France); p. 4 (Germany); and p. 4 (United Kingdom).

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 2 (Russian Federation); and p. 3 (China).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

March 2010 to December 2011: briefings by the Chairman of the 1737 Committee

From 4 March 2010 to 21 December 2011, the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to [resolution 1737 \(2006\)](#) (1737 Committee) regularly provided the Council with an update on the activities of the Committee. These activities included the receipt of the implementation reports from Member States pursuant to the relevant resolutions, the receipt of notifications pursuant to [resolution 1737 \(2006\)](#), and the receipt of and response to queries and written requests for guidance from Member States concerning the sanctions regime.¹⁷

On 4 March 2010, several speakers highlighted elements of the latest report of the Director-General of the IAEA as further evidence of the Islamic Republic of Iran's continued lack of compliance and cooperation with the IAEA and the Security Council obligations as well as the possible military dimension to its nuclear programme. They concurred that there was no choice but to seek new measures in keeping with the dual-track approach that left the door open for diplomacy.¹⁸ On the other hand, the representatives of the Russian Federation and China stressed the importance of continuing dialogue and diplomatic efforts in order to resolve the situation and achieve a peaceful settlement.¹⁹ The representative of the Russian Federation emphasized that room for negotiations still existed, including the pursuit of a convincing and mutually acceptable fuel-exchange model for Tehran's Research Reactor.²⁰ While the representative of China expressed hope that all parties concerned would take the broader and more long term situation into consideration,²¹ the representative of the Russian Federation called on Tehran to make the necessary accommodations to ensure the resumption of dialogue with the "P5+1" with a view towards achieving a negotiated settlement of the situation concerning the Iranian nuclear programme.²²

¹⁷ See [S/PV.6280](#), [S/PV.6344](#), [S/PV.6384](#), [S/PV.6442](#), [S/PV.6502](#), [S/PV.6563](#), [S/PV.6607](#), and [S/PV.6697](#).

¹⁸ [S/PV.6280](#), p. 4 (United States); p. 5 (United Kingdom); and p. 7 (France).

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 7 (Russian Federation); and pp. 7-8 (China).

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 7.

On 28 June 2010, several speakers expressed concern about the Islamic Republic of Iran’s continuing nuclear activities and its denial of access to its facilities to the IAEA. The representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, France, China, and the Russian Federation expressed their support for the resumption of dialogue in order to resolve the situation concerning the Iranian nuclear programme, and for the dual-track strategy on the Islamic Republic of Iran.²³ The representative of the United Kingdom joined the representative of the United States in urging the preparation of an ambitious Committee work programme pursuant to [resolution 1929 \(2010\)](#).²⁴ The representative of the United States specifically encouraged the Chairman of the Committee to personally engage with the Committee on setting out such a programme, and further encouraged the Committee and the Secretariat to work together to establish the newly created panel of experts which would become the “eyes and ears” of the Security Council in the field.²⁵ Furthermore, the representative of China stated that all parties should continue to work actively to promote the implementation of the Tehran Declaration signed by Brazil, Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran. He maintained that the Islamic Republic of Iran had expressed its willingness to negotiate with the international community and to cooperate with the IAEA. He hoped that all parties would seize the opportunity to resume talks and to carry out diplomatic efforts, especially outside the Security Council, to find a peaceful solution.²⁶ The representative of the Russian Federation emphasized that strict compliance with the Council’s measures required Member States to refrain from taking additional restrictive steps not covered under the relevant resolutions, especially those of an extraterritorial nature. He expressed concern over the prevention by third-party States of the delivery of supplies to the Islamic Republic of Iran, under the pretext that the supplies were not in compliance with the domestic norms of those States.²⁷

²³ [S/PV.6344](#), p. 3 (United States); pp. 3-4 (United Kingdom); and pp. 4-5 (France); p. 5 (Russian Federation); and pp. 5-6 (China).

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 3 (United States); and p. 4 (United Kingdom).

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 3 (United States).

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

On 15 September 2010, the representative of the United States stated that the Director-General of the IAEA had reported to the Security Council that the Islamic Republic of Iran was continuing and expanding its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities in violation of its international obligations. She emphasized that the Islamic Republic of Iran's recent actions reminded the Council of the urgent need to redouble its efforts to implement the United Nations sanctions, particularly those new measures adopted in [resolution 1929 \(2010\)](#).²⁸ The representative of the United Kingdom expressed his Government's concern about both the Iranian nuclear programme and the Islamic Republic of Iran's serial violation of the resolutions of the Security Council, which was why his country supported [resolution 1929 \(2010\)](#), which introduced further sanctions. He specifically highlighted his Government's concerns over the Islamic Republic of Iran's engagement in activities related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and advocated that the Council and the Committee should consider an appropriate response.²⁹

On 10 December 2010, the Council heard a briefing by the Chairman of the 1737 Committee, who reported on the appointment of the Panel of Experts established under paragraph 29 of [resolution 1929 \(2010\)](#). Following the briefing, speakers welcomed its establishment.³⁰ The representative of the United States noted that not much had changed since the adoption of [resolution 1929 \(2010\)](#), as the Islamic Republic of Iran persisted in its non-compliance with IAEA and Council resolutions, as well as its defiance of the international community. She commended Nigeria and Italy on their seizures of illegal arms shipments, and reiterated her country's commitment to the dual-track strategy, with the aim of continuing a phased confidence-building process between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the international community.³¹ The representative of China, hoping that the IAEA could play a constructive role in finding an appropriate solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, emphasized that the sanctions were not an end in themselves and could not fundamentally resolve any issue. He further emphasized that a new opportunity to restart

²⁸ [S/PV.6384](#), pp. 3-4.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

³⁰ [S/PV.6442](#), p. 4 (United Kingdom); p. 5 (China); pp. 5-6 (France); pp. 6-7 (Russian Federation); and pp. 7-8 (United States).

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

the dialogue on the Iranian nuclear issue existed, and highlighted the positive and useful dialogue carried out in Geneva.³²

On 22 March 2011, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom expressed concern about the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear activities, including its continuation of enrichment and its lack of cooperation with the IAEA, as conveyed in the IAEA's latest report.³³ Many speakers also expressed disappointment with the lack of progress in the discussions held in Istanbul between the "P5+1" and the Islamic Republic of Iran.³⁴ While several speakers stressed the Islamic Republic of Iran's right to the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, some also called for it to abide by its international obligations.

On 23 June 2011, several speakers expressed concern over the Islamic Republic of Iran's announcement that it would significantly boost its enrichment activities, and that it had successfully launched a second satellite into orbit. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that such actions were clear evidence of the Islamic Republic of Iran's continued defiance of the Council's sanctions regime. He further stated that, despite repeated assertions that its nuclear programme was peaceful, the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to obstruct, at every level, efforts by the IAEA to ascertain the true nature of its atomic activities.³⁵ The representatives of France and Germany further argued that given the Islamic Republic of Iran's unwillingness to talk about its nuclear programme, there was no choice other than following up on the pressure track of the dual-track strategy to move the Islamic Republic of Iran back to the negotiation table.³⁶ Meanwhile, the representatives of China, Portugal, and Brazil emphasized that the prompt resumption of dialogue was the only way to reach an adequate and lasting settlement that would meet the common interests of all parties.³⁷

³² Ibid., p. 5.

³³ [S/PV.6502](#), p. 3 (United States); and p. 5 (United Kingdom).

³⁴ Ibid., p. 4 (United States); p. 6 (Germany); p. 8 (Portugal); p. 8 (Brazil); and pp. 10-11 (France).

³⁵ [S/PV.6563](#), p. 3.

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 6-7 (France); and pp. 7-8 (Germany).

³⁷ Ibid., p. 5 (China); pp. 8-9 (Portugal); and pp. 10-11 (Brazil).

On 7 September 2011, most speakers expressed concern over the lack of progress towards a negotiated settlement regarding the transparency of the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear activities, as indicated in the latest report of the IAEA. Furthermore, many speakers expressed concern that the final report of the Panel of Experts had not yet been posted on the Committee's website.³⁸ The representative of the United States stated that her Government strongly believed that this report should be made available to all States as soon as possible, as it highlighted information and best practices that could help States carry out their obligations, and failure to circulate these documents contravened the Committee's commitment to transparency and undermined the entire purpose behind having a Panel of Experts.³⁹

On 21 December 2011, several speakers continued to express concern about the non-publication of the Panel of Experts' last report on the Islamic Republic of Iran. The representative of the United States specifically emphasized her Government's serious concerns that the Panel of Experts' final report had yet to have been released to the wider United Nations membership, owing to the continued objections of some members of the Council. She also drew the Council's attention to the recently released report by the Director-General of the IAEA, which concluded that the Islamic Republic of Iran remained in non-compliance with its international nuclear obligations and added to the evidence that the Islamic Republic of Iran was misleading the international community about its nuclear activities. She highlighted the Islamic Republic of Iran's self-proclaimed intention to start enrichment at its underground Qom facility. Stressing that the Islamic Republic of Iran's behaviour plainly belied the purported peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, she called for the Council to redouble its efforts to implement sanctions that had already been imposed.⁴⁰

The representative of South Africa further highlighted that a renewed dedication by the Islamic Republic of Iran to intensify cooperation with the IAEA, without

³⁸ [S/PV.6607](#), p. 3 (United States); p. 5 (France); p. 6 (Germany); p. 11 (Gabon); and p. 12 (United Kingdom).

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁴⁰ [S/PV.6697](#), p. 3.

preconditions, was of the utmost importance.⁴¹ However, many speakers expressed their support for the sanctions regime, and the representative of the United Kingdom specifically emphasized that sanctions were a key tool to convince the Islamic Republic of Iran to engage seriously in response to offers on the table.⁴²

⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 5-6.

⁴² Ibid., p. 3 (United States); p. 8 (France); p. 9 (United Kingdom); p. 10 (Germany); and p. 13 (Russian Federation).

Meetings: non-proliferation

<i>Meeting and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
6280 4 March 2010	Briefing by the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006)			Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) (Japan), China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States	
6334 (closed) 8 June 2010			Invited speakers	Council members and all invitees	
6335 9 June 2010		Draft resolution submitted by France, Germany, United Kingdom, United States (S/2010/283)	Germany, Islamic Republic of Iran	14 Council members, ^a Islamic Republic of Iran	Resolution 1929 (2010) 12-2-1 ^b
6344 28 June 2010	Briefing by the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006)			Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) (Japan), China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States	
6384 15 September 2010	Briefing by the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006)			Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) (Japan), China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States	
6442 10 December 2010	Briefing by the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006)			Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) (Japan), China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States	
6502 22 March 2011	Briefing by the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006)			Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) (Colombia), 14 Council members ^c	

<i>Meeting and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
6552 9 June 2011		Draft resolution submitted by France, Germany, United Kingdom, United States (S/2011/348)		China, Germany, France, Lebanon, Russian Federation, United States, United Kingdom	Resolution 1984 (2011) 14-0-1 ^d
6563 23 June 2011	Briefing by the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006)			Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) (Colombia), and all Council members	
6607 7 September 2011	Briefing by the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006)			Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) (Colombia), and all Council members	
6697 21 December 2011	Briefing by the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006)			Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) (Colombia), and all Council members	

^a Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, China, France, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom and United States.

^b For: Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, China, France, Gabon, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States; against: Brazil, Turkey; abstaining: Lebanon.

^c Brazil, China, Colombia, France, Gabon, Germany, India, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, Russian Federation, South Africa, United Kingdom and United States.

^d For: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, China, Colombia, France, Gabon, Germany, India, Nigeria, Portugal, Russian Federation, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States; abstaining: Lebanon